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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, CHURCH AUTONOMY,
AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
Richard W. Garnett*
Our topic at this symposium is "religion, the state, and
constitutionalism"-not "the Constitution," or "the First Amendment,"
but "constitutionalism." Countless conferences, cases, books, and articles
have wrestled with one version or another of the question, "how does our
Constitution, with its First Amendment and its religion clauses, promote,
protect, or perhaps restrain religion?" We are considering, it seems to me,
a question that is different, and that is different in interesting and
important ways: What are connections between religion and religious
freedom, on the one hand, and constitutionalism, on the other?
So what is "constitutionalism"? This is a huge and complicated
question to which I will provide a quick-and-dirty answer.
Constitutionalism is the enterprise of protecting human freedom and
promoting the common good by categorizing, separating, structuring, and
limiting power in entrenched and enforceable ways. For some, it is
essential to this enterprise that it happens in and through writing. Walton
Hamilton, for example, said more than seventy years ago that
"[c]onstitutionalism is the name given to the trust which men repose in the
power of words.., to keep a government in order."1 The historian Charles
McIlwain was even more succinct. "Constitutionalism," he said, "has one
essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government."2 Yet another
feature of constitutionalism-perhaps even an "essential" one-is that the
enterprise is animated by an appreciation for the fact that the authority of
government, which is limited legally by the constitution, is not the only
authority at work in human society and affairs. As Harold Berman put it,
"[p]erhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the Western legal tradition
is the coexistence and competition within the same community of diverse
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Notre Dame Law School; B.A.,
Duke University, 1990; J.D., Yale Law School, 1995. I am grateful to my friend and
former colleague, Professor Mark Kende, for inviting me to participate in this
symposium and for his leadership of the Drake Constitutional Law Center.
1. Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 16 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (quoting Walton H.
Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (Edwin
R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1931)).
2. CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND
MODERN 24 (2005).
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jurisdictions and diverse legal systems. It is this plurality of jurisdictions
and legal systems that makes the supremacy of law both necessary and
possible. ' 3 This pluralism, Berman thought, has nurtured legal, political,
and economic growth; it also both reflects and protects political and other
freedoms.4
Great English legal historians like Maitland and Maine also
appreciated the fact that distinctions and competition among plural
authorities have been and remain crucial to constitutionalism's success. 5
And so, a regime that concentrates authority in any one place-the state,
the church, the market, the mob-and suppresses it elsewhere is not really
an authentic constitutional regime. To say that "there can be no rights
except the right of the State, and... there can be no other authority than
the authority of the Republic" is, it would seem, to reject
constitutionalism. 6 Rousseau's assertion that "a democratic society should
be one in which absolutely nothing stands between man and the state,"'
like his contention that non-state authorities and associations should be
proscribed,8 was deeply anti-constitutional.
The Constitution of the United States, on the other hand-for all of
its flaws and foibles-seems to me a shining example of constitutionalism.
As (I hope) every law student learns, those who designed and ratified the
Constitution understood and embraced the idea that political liberties are
best served through competition and cooperation among plural authorities
and jurisdictions, and through structures and mechanisms that check,
diffuse, and divide power. 9 As Justice O'Connor observed, "perhaps our
3. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 10 (1983).
4. Id.
5. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, The Constitution of the United States, in
POPULAR GOVERNMENT: FOUR ESSAYS 196, 196-254 (1886) (discussing and praising
the separation of powers in the United States); FREDERIC W. MAITLAND & FRANCIS C.
MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 78-79 (James F. Colby ed., 1915)
(describing the Magna Charta as one example of a beneficial product of competing
interests and authorities and as a "prologue" to British constitutionalism).
6. William A. Galston, The Idea of Political Pluralism, in NOMOS XLIX:
MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 95, 102 (Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S.
Williams eds., 2009) (quoting J.N. Figgis, The Great Leviathon, in THE PLURALIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 112 (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989)).
7. George H. Sabine, The Two Democratic Traditions, 61 PHIL. REV. 451,
464 (1952).
8. Robert A. Nisbet, Rousseau and Totalitarianism, 5 J. POL. 93, 103 (1943).
9. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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oldest question of constitutional law ... consists of discerning the proper
division of authority between the Federal Government and the States."' 10
Our Constitution is more than a litany of prohibitions or a catalogue of
individual rights. Our constitutional law is, at bottom, "the law governing
the structure of, and the allocation of authority among, the various
institutions of the national government."" And our constitutional
experiment reflects, among other things, the belief that the structure of
government matters for, and contributes to, the good of human persons.
"Th[e] constitutionally mandated division of authority," Chief Justice
Rehnquist once wrote, "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection
of our fundamental liberties."1 2 Indeed, "the promise of liberty," Justice
O'Connor suggested, lies in this "tension between federal and state
power." 13 The "[s]eparation of powers," in other words, "was designed to
implement a fundamental insight: Concentration of power in the hands of
a single branch is a threat to liberty."14 One could go on and on, of course,
gathering observations by Madison and Montesquieu, Tocqueville and
Tiebout; expounding on "checks and balances," subsidiarity, localism, and
pluralism; and compiling imposing citation lists in support of the
proposition that our Constitution was designed to protect individual liberty
by dividing, enumerating, and reserving governments' powers and
authority. There is no need, however, to belabor even a point as
fundamental as this one: "The genius of the American Constitution"-of
American constitutionalism-"lies in its use of structural devices to
preserve individual liberty."'
5
Well, what does this all have to do with religion? Here is the claim:
Constitutionalism relies, both in theory and in fact, not only on the
separation and limitation of the powers of the political authority, but also
on the existence and the health of authorities and associations outside, and
meaningfully independent of, the state. And, our tradition of
constitutionalism was made possible, and might still depend today, on the
independence of the church from secular control. It is a mistake, then, to
10. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
11. Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course:
Separation of Powers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 885, 885
(2005).
12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
13. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991).
14. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1155 (1992).
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regard "religion" merely as a private practice, or even as a social
phenomenon, to which constitutions respond or react. Instead, we should
understand the ongoing enterprise of constitutionalism as one to which
religious claims and authorities contribute in many ways.
Constitutionalism requires for its success not the exclusion of religious faith
from political life or civil society, but the differentiation of religious and
political authorities. 16
These are highly abstract thoughts and general observations. They
can, though, be connected to the American conversation about church-
state separation. Step back with me for a moment to kinder and gentler
days. In 1988, out on the campaign trail, then-Vice President George H.
W. Bush recalled being shot down over the South Pacific during World
War II:
Was I scared floating around in a little yellow raft off the coast of an
enemy-held island, setting a world record for paddling? Of course I
was. What sustains you in times like that? Well, you go back to
fundamental values. I thought about Mother and Dad and the
strength I got from them-and God and faith and the separation of
Church and State. 17
This train of thought strikes us as absurd, but it is entirely American.
That "God" and "faith" could not be invoked by the would-be-president as
"fundamental values" without the clunky addition of "the separation of
church and state" speaks volumes about how we think about the content
and the implications of religious freedom.
An earlier president-Thomas Jefferson-in his 1802 letter to the
Danbury Baptists, famously professed his "sovereign reverence" for what
he saw as the decision of the American people to constitutionalize church-
state "separation."' 8 In so doing, he supplied what is for many the
"authoritative interpretation" of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses. 19 Indeed, Professor Daniel Dreisbach has observed that "[n]o
16. For more on "differentiation"-the "degree of mutual autonomy between
religious bodies and state institutions in their foundational legal authority"-see
Daniel Philpott, Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion, 101 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 505 (2007).
17. Cullen Murphy, War Is Heck, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1988, at A21.
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist
Association (Jan. 1, 1802), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
19. Philip Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, 18 J.L. & POL. 7, 7
(2002).
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metaphor in American letters has had a greater influence on law and policy
than Thomas Jefferson's 'wall of separation"' image. 20 "Jefferson's words,"
Professor Hamburger has observed, "seem to have shaped the nation,
21
and are, for many of us, "more familiar than the words of the First
Amendment itself. ' 22 However, that we are familiar, even intimate, with
Jefferson's words hardly means that we agree about their meaning.
Notwithstanding the third President's "reverence" for church-state
separation and the comfort that it supplied to our paddling forty-first
President, the idea remains controversial and contestable. What does it
mean for "church" and "state" to be separate? Is church-state
"separation" even an imaginable reality, let alone a constitutional
requirement? Or are Professors Eisgruber and Sager right to insist, in their
recent and important book, that "[c]hurch and state are not separate in the
United States, and they cannot possibly be separate"? 23 Indeed, what
about the assertion by then-Representative Katherine Harris that the
separation of church and state is a "lie we have been told" to keep religious
believers out of politics and public life?2 4 This charge seems well off the
mark, but there is no denying that separation is often presented, both by
opponents and by defenders of the idea, as an aggressively anti-religious
program, rather than, as John Courtney Murray put it, "'a policy to
implement the principle of religious freedom.'
25
Now, we can and do fight and write about the question whether the
Supreme Court was correct to constitutionalize Jefferson's "wall of
separation. ' 26 For now, put that question aside. The distinction between,
and the separation of, religious and governmental authority is crucial to
America's healthy secularism and to religious freedom more generally. So,
contrary to the clumsy claims of some, church-state separation is not a lie.
Pope Benedict XVI was clear and correct when he praised recently the
"positive" secularity that has characterized the American approach to
20. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers of the "Wall of Separation"
Between Church and State, IMPRIMIS, Oct. 2006, at 1, 1.
21. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1 (2002).
22. See Hamburger, Separation and Interpretation, supra note 19, at 7.
23. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 6-7 (2007).
24. Jim Stratton, Rep. Harris Condemns Separation of Church, State,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 2006, at A9.
25. John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 23, 32 (1949) (quoting Thomas B. Keehn, Church-State Relations, Soc.
ACTION, Nov. 15, 1948, at 31).
26. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
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religious liberty and church-state relations.2 7  "Fundamental to
Christianity," he wrote, "is the distinction between what belongs to Caesar
and what belongs to God (cf. Mt 22:21), in other words, the distinction
between Church and State, or. .. the autonomy of the temporal sphere. '28
Notice, he did not characterize this distinction as something imposed on
Christianity from the outside, or as something to which religious believers
might possibly adapt. The distinction, instead, is "fundamental to
Christianity.' 29 In a similar vein, he has emphasized that "[t]he idea of the
separation of Church and State came into the world first through
Christianity. Until then the political constitution and religion were always
united. It was the norm in all cultures for the state to have sacrality in itself
and be the supreme protector of sacrality."30  Christianity, however,
"deprived the state of its sacral nature.... In this sense," he has insisted,
"separation is ultimately a primordial Christian legacy." 31
Thus, institutional and jurisdictional separation of religious and
political authority, the independence of religious communities from
government oversight, the right to church autonomy and self-government,
a strict rule against formal religious tests for public office-these are all
separationist features of our experiment in constitutionalism, and not just
bullet-points taken from the Court's First Amendment doctrine. Properly
understood-to be sure, it is not always properly understood--church-
state "separation" stands as a safeguard against governments tempted to
assume for themselves the power to direct religious life. It is a limit on
government and such limits, again, are essential to constitutionalism. Now,
some say that church-state separation requires the government to maintain
a thoroughly secular civil conversation, a public square scrubbed clean of
religion. This is wrong. It is not true to the principles that animate
constitutionalism, or our Constitution. Our Constitution separates church
and state not to confine religious belief or silence religious expression but, I
think, to curb the ambitions and reach of governments. In our laws,
"Caesar recognizes that he is only Caesar and forswears any attempt to




29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, THE SALT OF THE EARTH: THE CHURCH
AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 239 (IGNATIUS PRESS, 1997) (1996).
31. Id. at 240.
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demand what is God's." 32
Now, to say all this is not to imagine that a high "wall" between
"church" and "state" is possible or that one could ever separate cleanly the
roles of citizen and believer. The point is not to say that religion should be
radically privatized or that political arguments should be limited to those
that sound in cost-benefit analysis. It is, instead, to affirm the
independence of religious institutions from government control. This
independence is the church-state issue. It is important to the pluralism that
sustains our experiment in constitutionalism. And, it is vulnerable.
Why, and how, is it vulnerable? It is not new to observe that
American public conversations about religious freedom tend to focus on
individuals' rights, beliefs, consciences, and practices. The distinctive
place, role, and freedoms of religious groups, associations, and institutions
are often overlooked. However, an understanding of religious faith, and
religious freedom, that stops with the liberty of individual conscience, and
neglects institutions and communities, will be incomplete. And, so will the
legal arrangements and constitutional structures that such an
understanding produces.
32. William Clancy, Religion as a Source of Tension, in RELIGION AND THE




DR. JEREMY GUNN: Rick, I think that was a terrific
presentation-it was nuanced and in many ways I agree with it-but there
is one thing that troubled me a little bit. It is an expression that I hear that
I think of as a straw man, so I will give you a chance to show that it is a
flesh and blood man. It is the expression about "scrubbing the public
square clean of religion." That is the kind of expression I hear is often
directed at the ACLU-that the ACLU will stop at nothing until it has
destroyed every vestige of religion in the public square. And this strikes
me as nonsense because in the public square in the United States, religion
is pervasive-whether preachers on public airwaves, candidates speaking
about religion, Bibles sold through the United States Postal Service, or
people giving religious talks on sidewalks. If somebody tries to stop any of
those forms of religious expression in the public square, my organization
and other organizations will defend it. Nobody is trying to take that
discussion of religion out of the public square. And if a politician says that
he or she is voting against a law that would allow abortion because he or
she is Catholic-although there might be a disagreement about whether
that is a good idea or not-nobody is going to sue that politician and argue
that he or she cannot say that. And there is no standing to sue. Religious
expression in the public square is there, it is constitutionally protected, and
nobody is trying to scrub it. I do not know where this stuff comes from.
PROFESSOR RICHARD GARNETT: Thanks, Jeremy. You are
right-religion is pervasive in this country's public life, and no one could
scrub it away, even if one wanted to. What I meant to say is that we should
not think that the separation of church and state, properly understood,
requires any such thing. Now, that said, one does sometimes hear it
claimed that a commitment to liberal democracy and to church-state
separation also requires the privatization of religious arguments. I do not
think it does. So, while I agree with you that the ACLU has an excellent
record of defending private religious expression in the public square, I do
think it is always worth taking the time to disentangle the idea of
separation-which is important-from the demand for privatization, which
is misplaced.
PROFESSOR FRANK RAVITCH: I think there is an interesting
corollary to the separation you are talking about that might also explain a
lot of what you are talking about: Roger Williams's notion of the garden
and the wilderness-the idea that there must be a strong hedge wall
between the garden of religion and the corrupt, growing, weedy wilderness
of government, because without that hedge wall government will overtake
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religion. And actually although Roger Williams is the one most people
quote, there were others before and after him who used the same analogy.
So I think that one of the things that supports your suggestion-although I
am just throwing it out there-is the idea that there are very strong
religious arguments for separation that augment Jefferson's "protecting the
state from religion" argument. And together, those would suggest the
structural sorts of things that you, and I think also Carl Esbeck, have talked
about a bit. So I am wondering if that is relevant to what you are talking
about or if I am just off the mark.
PROFESSOR RICHARD GARNETT: No, you are not off the
mark at all. That image of "the garden and the wilderness" is helpful to
understanding the church-state relationship. I would add a cautious
footnote to Williams, though: In my view, our commitment to the
distinction between church and state does not require us to write off as just
weeds and wilderness the important work of politics or the challenge of
promoting the common good. So, I think religious believers have very
good religious reasons for insisting on a distinction between religious and
political authority. There are good religious reasons for protecting
religious authority from state interference. But I probably would not go as
far as Williams seemed to in disdaining the possibility that religion or
religious believers might need to come out from behind the wall, now and
again, to contribute to the shared, public project of trying to order our lives
together.
PROFESSOR ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM: I appreciate
your emphasis on the communal and institutional dimension of religion in
that you have to respect the autonomy and independence of all religious
organizations. But the state still has to deal with those groups. And how
can it deal with them without having anything to do with the way they are
organized, and how one goes on within those organizations, and how to
keep the possibility of dissent within those communities alive so that the
existing structures do not stifle vigorous dissent within the community
itself? I am particularly struck with the case of Europe because I am trying
to write something about Muslims in Germany. The German system is so
structured around the Catholic and Evangelical churches that the state is
very effective in dealing with those institutions and very respectful and
cooperative-what they call positive neutrality-but they do not know
what to do with the Muslims because they are not organized in the same
way. And I worry about the state having to deal with communities,
coercing or repressing those communities to organize in Christian ways so
that we can recognize them and deal with them.
910 [Vol. 57
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PROFESSOR RICHARD GARNETT: I would like to affirm the
concerns you are expressing. You are right that the understanding of
church-state separation I am talking about does not include or suggest a
rule that the government may not or will not ever deal with religion. Such
dealings are unavoidable. And I agree with you that we should worry if
and when the government, for its own purposes, attempts to impose certain
models of polity and governance on religious communities. We might
disagree, though, over whether it is ever appropriate for governments
purposely to facilitate "dissent" within religious communities. The
government, it seems to me, should not artificially prop up either the
orthodox or the dissenters. It is sometimes suggested that the public
authority should be proactive in identifying and encouraging the
dissenters-assuming those dissenters' views are consistent with the
government's aims. But this is dangerous, and it should make us uneasy.
The government might well have hopes for the dissenters in some
communities and traditions, but if church-state separation means anything,
it means that struggles within the church over doctrine, teaching, and
orthodoxy have to be the church's own business.
The ongoing church property disputes illustrate and confirm the
difficulties that arise when the government gets involved--or is invited to
get involved-in intra-religious controversies. As I am sure many of you
know, in the Episcopal community there are disagreements between some
parishes and the national church over some social, political, and theological
issues, and these disagreements are leading to arguments about who owns
and gets to keep all of the community's nice buildings and property. Now,
if the community breaks up, or if some parishes break away, the
government cannot avoid entirely the problem of deciding who gets the
property. It has to come up with some rules for adjudicating these
disputes. The challenge is finding a rule that is consistent with both the
government's obligation to protect and enforce rights and its obligation to
respect religious self-government.
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